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Abstract. In this paper, we present an evolutionary model of industry dynamics yielding endogenous
business cycles with ‘Keynesian’ features. The model describes an economy composed of firms
and consumers/workers. Firms belong to two industries. The first one performs R&D and produces
heterogeneous machine tools. Firms in the second industry invest in new machines and produce a
homogenous consumption good. Consumers sell their labor and fully consume their income. In line
with the empirical literature on investment patterns, we assume that the investment decisions by firms
are lumpy and constrained by their financial structures. Moreover, drawing from behavioral theories
of the firm, we assume boundedly rational expectation formation. Simulation results show that the
model is able to deliver self-sustaining patterns of growth characterized by the presence of endogenous
business cycles. The model can also replicate the most important stylized facts concerning micro- and
macro-economic dynamics. Indeed, we find that investment is more volatile than GDP; consumption is
less volatile than GDP; investment, consumption and change in stocks are procyclical and coincident
variables; employment is procyclical; unemployment rate is anticyclical; firm size distributions are
skewed but depart from log-normality; firm growth distributions are tent-shaped.
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1. Introduction
The existence of widespread and persistent fluctuations which permanently affect
the overall economic activity is an inherent feature of all modern economies. How-
ever, despite the huge number of competing models providing a rationale for ex-
pansions and recessions, we still lack a generally accepted explanation for business
fluctuations. Indeed, it still holds largely true that a good deal of research has been
mainly concerned with ‘theoretical possibilities, rather than with explanations of
what actually happens,’ with ‘little regard for how the pieces fit each other and the
real world’ (Zarnowitz, 1985, p. 570). Ultimately, the theory of business cycle ap-
pears to be ‘long of both good and poor questions and short of persuasive answers’
(Zarnowitz, 1997, p. 2).
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A primary example of such a mismatching might be found in the ways eco-
nomic theory deals with the stylized facts concerning microeconomic investment
dynamics and business cycle properties. A robust macroeconomic empirical lit-
erature has indeed shown that, at the aggregate level, investment is consider-
ably more volatile than output and consumption less volatile. Moreover, fluctu-
ations of both output and its main components (i.e. investment, consumption and
changes in inventories) tend to be synchronized. Finally, at the microeconomic level,
firms’ investments appear to be lumpy and strongly affected by firms’ financial
structures.
Needless to say, one does indeed find huge streams of work on business cycles
mostly belonging either to the Real Business Cycle (RBC) perspective or to the
New-Keynesian (NK) one. This is not the place to undertake a review of the litera-
ture (on RBC, cf. King and Rebelo (1999) and Stadler (1994); on NK theories, see
Mankiw and Romer (1991) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993)). Let us just mention
here the basic mechanisms generating cycles in the two perspectives. Real-business
cycles are ultimately driven by exogenous and unpredictable technological shocks,
which generate fluctuating dynamics in a stochastic general-equilibrium world,
grounded upon a fully-rational, forward-looking representative agent. Conversely,
the basic story of NK models finds the roots of economic fluctuations in product-,
labor- and financial-market imperfections (including in primis informational asym-
metries). At the same time, these models do allow for some heterogeneity, at least
in the functional roles of the agents (the economy is in fact populated by financial
investors, firms, consumers, etc.), even if under the disguise of ‘representative’,
fully rational types.
Certainly, one finds very hard to believe the existence of macroscopic tech-
nological shocks (including negative ones) necessary for the RBC story to hold.1
And, conversely, while the informational setting of NK models is much more rea-
sonable, we still feel uneasy about the almost exclusive emphasis upon monetary
and price shocks as drivers of the fluctuations, while neglecting all technological
factors.
Moreover, in our view, a major weakness – shared to different degrees by both
streams of literature – is the persistent clash between the microeconomics that
one finds in the models and the regularities in microeconomic behaviors that one
empirically observes. So, for example, notwithstanding the proliferation of models
separately trying to account for micro and macro stylized facts, almost no attempts
have been made in the literature to explain the properties of business cycles on
the basis of multiple individual entities embodying the observed microeconomic
regularities about firms’ investment and pricing behaviors.
In this paper, we try to bridge such a gap by proposing a model where
both output and investment dynamics are grounded upon lumpy investment
decisions undertaken by boundedly-rational firms constrained by their finan-
cial structure, but, at the same time, always able to discover new production
technologies.
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First, we fully take on board the critique to the ‘representative agent fallacies’
(Kirman, 1989, 1992) and describe an economy with heterogeneous agents that
interact in explicitly modeled markets.
Second, well in line with Keynesian intuitions, we assume pervasive market
uncertainty, so that investment and pricing decisions are taken on the grounds of
boundedly-rational rules, most often involving adaptive expectations. In turn, such
decisions bear permanent aggregate demand effects.
Conversely, third, the ‘Schumpeterian’ feature of the model regards the persistent
arrival of technological innovations, entailing multiple endogenously generated
micro-shocks on productivity.
The model depicts an economy composed by firms (operating in two vertically-
linked industries), consumers/workers and a (unmodeled) non-market sector. Firms
in the ‘upstream’ industry perform R&D and produce technologically heteroge-
neous machines. The latter are used in the ‘downstream’ industry to produce a
consumption good bought by workers with their wages and by recipients of in-
comes in the non-market sector.
The work belongs to the evolutionary, ‘agent-based computational economics’
(ACE), family.2 In each period t , firms and workers carry out their production,
investment, and consumption decisions on the basis of routinized behavioral rules
and (adaptive) expectations. The dynamics of microeconomic variables (i.e. indi-
vidual production, investment, consumption, etc.) thus induces the macroeconomic
dynamics for aggregate variables (e.g. aggregate output, investment, consumption,
etc.), whose statistical properties are then studied and compared with empirically
observed ones.
Simulation results show that the model is able to deliver self-sustaining growth
patterns characterized by endogenous business cycles. Moreover, we show that the
model is able to replicate those business cycle stylized facts (e.g. volatility, auto-
and cross-correlation patterns) actually observed. Finally, the micro-structure of the
simulated economy is quite in tune with the evidence on e.g. persistent heterogeneity
in firm efficiencies, size and growth rate distributions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview
of micro and macro empirical evidence. In Section 3, we discuss the antecedents and
theoretical roots of our model, which we formally present in Section 4. Qualitative
and quantitative results of simulation exercises are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2. Aggregate Fluctuations and Micro Regularities: Some Evidence
To repeat, a good check of the robustness of any model claiming to be able to
‘explain’ business cycles ought to rest in its ability to account together for more
than one macroeconomic ‘stylized fact’ and ought to do it in ways which are
coherent with the observed microeconomics of business decisions and innovation
patterns. Let us thus consider the most relevant empirical regularities.
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2.1. MACRO STYLIZED FACTS
A key issue in the empirical business cycle literature concerns the properties of
aggregate output and of its main components (i.e. investment, consumption and
inventories).
All available statistical evidence suggests that recurrent fluctuations have char-
acterized the whole history of industrial economies. This applies also to the period
after WWII, when aggregate output and its main components have experienced an
impressive long term growth in the U.S. as well as in other developed countries.
Even then, however, time-series display growth together with persistent ‘cyclical’
turbulences. This can be seen also if the dynamics of output and its components is
analyzed at the business cycle frequencies: there, the series display a typical ‘roller
coaster’ shape, implying the repeated interchange of expansions and recessions
which are part of the very definition of the business cycle.3
Thus, the evidence pre- and post-WWII – which we summarize in Table I-
corroborates the seminal observations dating back to Kuznets (1930) and Burns
and Mitchell (1946), suggesting the following stylized facts:4
SF1 Investment is considerably more volatile than output.
SF2 Consumption is less volatile that output.
SF3 Investment, consumption and change in inventories tend to be procyclical and
coincident variables.5
SF4 Aggregate employment and unemployment rate tend to be lagging variables.
The former is procyclical, whereas the latter is anticyclical.
2.2. MICRO STYLIZED FACTS
Over the last couple of decades, the empirical literature on industrial dynamics and
technological change has singled out an impressive number of robust statistical
regularities concerning the microeconomic properties of firm behavioral patterns.
Let us begin here with a telegraphical account of those stylized facts pertaining to
firms’ investment decisions.
SF5 Investment is lumpy.
SF6 Investment is influenced by firms’ financial structure.
Consider first SF5. As shown by the important work of Doms and Dunne (1998)
based on U.S. plant level data, lumpiness is an intrinsic feature of firm investment
decisions: in a given year, 51.9% of all plants increase their capital stock by less
than 2.5%, while the 11% of them raise it by more than 20%. Moreover, within-
plant investment patterns show that plants typically invest in every single year, but
they concentrate half of their total investment in just three years out of the sixteen
under analysis.
Moreover, the microeconomic lumpiness of investment does not appear to
be completely filtered away at the macroeconomic level. Aggregate investment
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fluctuations are indeed influenced by the number of plants incurring huge investment
episodes: the correlation between aggregate investment and the number of plants
experiencing their maximum investment share is 0.59.
As far SF6 is concerned, the evidence is even more impressive. Since the influ-
ential work of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), a huge stream of empirical
literature6 has been providing evidence against the Modigliani and Miller (1958)
theorem. Indeed, if capital markets are imperfect (e.g. because of information asym-
metries), the financial structure of the firm is likely to affect its investment decisions.
First, the cost of external financing is typically higher than that of internal financ-
ing: the larger information costs born by each firm, the higher the gap between the
cost of internal and external financing. Second, information asymmetries may lead
lenders to ration credit to the riskiest firms. These propositions are supported by
the evidence provided by the so-called ‘financial constraints’ literature: ceteribus
paribus, firm investment is significantly correlated with cash flows (a proxy for net
worth variations) and the correlation magnitude is higher for those firms that suffer
more from information asymmetries plaguing capital market (e.g. young and small
firms).7
Regarding the drivers of growth, a growing number of contributions has robustly
highlighted the central role of technological learning, innovation and diffusion
carried out by business firms (see Dosi, Freeman, and Fabiani (1994) for a critical
overview; more detailed discussions are in Rosenberg (1982, 1994), Freeman (1982)
and Dosi (1988)).
The idea that aggregate growth can be traced back to business history finds
quantitative roots in a series of robust stylized facts put forth by the literature on
the microeconomics of innovation. In a synthesis:
SF7 Firms are the main locus where technological accumulation takes place.
Technological learning - as well as its directions and rates – is carried out
by firms in ways which are strongly shaped by: (a) firm-specific abilities;
(b) richness of perceived unexploited opportunities. As a consequence,
technological learning and accumulation tends to be mostly local: tech-
nical advances typically occur in a neighborhood of currently-mastered
technologies. This cumulative learning pattern is ‘punctuated’ by major,
low-probability advances which generate jumps in the technological space
(i.e. changes in the technological paradigms).
SF8 Innovations take time to diffuse. Technological diffusion is slowed down by
information asymmetries and, even more important, by the fact that firms
require time to learn how to master new technologies and develop new skills.
SF9 Most innovations are industry-specific. Therefore, the overall pattern of
business fluctuations cannot be fully explained by economy-wide innovative
shocks.
In turn, the foregoing regularities concerning innovation and technological diffu-
sion map onto the intersectoral patterns of realized performances and productivities.
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Extensive studies on longitudinal micro-level data sets – ranging from the seminal
work of Nelson (1981) to the survey in Bartelsman and Doms (2000) – confirm that
productivity dynamics is characterized by a few robust regularities, namely:
SF10 Productivity dispersion among firms is considerably large.
SF11 Inter-firm productivity differentials are quite persistent over time.
Moreover, heterogeneity concerns firm size distributions, both among firms
belonging to the same industrial sector and across different industrial sectors (see,
among a vast literature, and Bottazzi and Secchi (2003b,a)).
SF12 Firm size distributions tend to be considerably right skewed, with upper-tails
made of few large firms. These patterns vary significantly across different
sectors.
As discussed at more length in e.g. Bottazzi, Cefis, and Dosi (2002), the forego-
ing regularity obviously supports the view that real-world markets strongly depart
from perfect competition. Moreover, a growing evidence highlights microeconomic
processes of growth entailing some underlying correlation structure and lumpiness.
More precisely:
SF13 Firm growth-rate distributions are not Gaussian and can be well proxied by
fat-tailed, tent-shaped densities.
According to SF13, firm growth patterns tend to display relatively frequent
‘big’ – negative or positive – growth events.
In the model presented below, we take explicitly on board micro-regularities
pertaining to firm investment and innovating behaviors (SF5 – 9) in the way we
design the agents populating our economy, with the aim of building a model that,
at the same time, is able to replicate and explain the stylized facts concerning the
business cycle (SF1 – 4) on the basis of micro-dynamics patterns which replicate
the statistical regularities displayed by the evolution of firm productivity, size and
growth over time (SF10 – 13).
3. Theoretical Roots and Antecedents
We have already mentioned that the model which follows belongs to the evolu-
tionary family. The seminal reference here is Nelson and Winter (1982). The work
shows, among other things, the straightforward possibility of generating patterns of
macroeconomic growth akin those observed in reality, on the grounds of a microe-
conomic structure made of heterogeneous agents that continuously try to innovate
and imitate new techniques of production. There, however, any ‘Keynesian’ de-
mand propagation effect is censored by construction, and so it is in many other
models of evolutionary inspiration.8
The first attempts to explore the properties of evolutionary models with
‘Keynesian’ demand propagation effects can be found in Chiaromonte and Dosi
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(1993) and in the simpler but multi-economy framework studied in Dosi, Fabiani,
Aversi, and Meacci (1994). In the former, one describes a two-sector economy with
machine-embodied innovations, imperfect competition and two fundamental feed-
backs running from investment to wages to aggregate demand (the ‘multiplier’),
and, the other way round, from aggregate demand to investment (the ‘accelerator’).
The present model refines upon this early templates and, for the first time,
analyzes the fine statistical properties of the ensuing dynamics. Moreover, the model
below tries to explicitly capture in its behavioral assumptions some of the micro
regularities mentioned above.
Consider, for instance, investment lumpiness (cf. SF5). It is well-known that the
latter can be in principle interpreted as the outcome of some optimizing behavior of
a perfectly-rational firm. This is indeed what the so-called (S,s) investment models
do.9 In that framework, firms face the problem of choosing the level of capital
maximizing their flow of profits. If their desired capital is larger than the actual
one, firms want to invest as long as they are able to recover capital adjustment
costs. However, if the latter present some non-convexities, firms will invest up to
some optimal target level (S) only if their capital imbalance is lower than a given
optimal trigger threshold (s). Therefore, investment lumpiness straightforwardly
derives from non-convexity of adjustment costs.
Notwithstanding the awareness that investment lumpiness may have significant
consequences at the macro level, almost no attempts have been made to embed the
observed microeconomic investment behavior into a business cycle model.10 More
specifically, a surprisingly little attention has been paid so far to the interpretation
of the stylized facts concerning the business cycle discussed above on the basis of
the microeconomic evidence on firm investment behavior (cf. SF5 and SF6).
In this paper, we take a preliminary step in this direction. In our model, invest-
ment can be either employed to increase the capital stock or to replace existing
capital goods. Consumption-good firms plan their expansion investment according
to a (S,s) pattern. However, we depart from the standard lumpy investment litera-
ture in modeling firms as boundedly-rational agents. In particular, we assume that
firms employ routinized behavioral investment rules instead of fully-rational, profit-
maximizing behaviors cum non-convex adjustment costs (on routinized behaviors,
see – within an enormous literature – Nelson and Winter (1982), Dosi (1988), Cyert
and March (1989) and, much earlier, Katona and Morgan (1952)).
We interpret the target and trigger levels of an (S,s)-type of investment behavior
in terms of a routinized investment rule, rather than as the outcome of some opti-
mization procedure. Indeed, firms operating in ‘evolutionary environments’ (Dosi,
Marengo, and Fagiolo, 2005) typically face strong uncertainty and cannot attach
any probability measure to future outcomes (more on that in Dosi and Egidi (1991)).
Hence, the adoption of a (S,s) rule fulfills the goals of a prudent, risk-averse, firm
which is not able to fully anticipate its future level of demand and forms its ex-
pectations in an adaptive fashion. Firms will then decide to expand their stock of
capital only if they expect a significant demand growth. As a result, they will invest
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to reach their target level of capital only if the fulfillment of their expected demand
requires a capital stock at least equal to their trigger level.
Similarly to what happens for expansion investment, firms employ routinized
behaviors to decide their replacement investment.11 In particular, we introduce
heterogenous capital goods and we assume that firms implement their replacement
policy through a payback-period routine. In this way, technical change and capital
good prices enter in the replacement decisions of consumption-good firms.
Finally, the financial structure of the firm does affect in our model its investment
policies (cf. SF6). Indeed, the presence of financial constraints implies that firms
pay a premium if they rely on external sources of funds (i.e. credit). Therefore, the
financial structure of firms might not be neutral: firms may turn to external credit
when their stock of liquid assets is not enough to fully finance their investment
plans.
4. The Model
We model an economy populated by F firms and L workers/consumers. Firms
are split in two industries: there are F1 consumption-good firms (labeled by j in
what follows) and F2 machine-tool firms (labeled by i). Of course, F = F1 +
F2. Consumption-good firms invest in machine-tools and produce a homogeneous
product for consumers. Machine-tool firms produce heterogenous capital goods and
perform R&D. Workers inelastically sell labor to firms in both sectors and fully
consume the income they receive. Investment choices of consumption-good firms
determine the level of income, consumption and employment in the economy.
In the next subsection, we shall firstly describe in a telegraphic way the dynamics
of events in a representative time-period. Next, we shall provide a more detailed
account of each event separately.
4.1. THE DYNAMICS OF MICROECONOMIC DECISIONS
In any discrete time period t = 1, 2, . . . , the timeline of events runs as follows:12
1. Consumption-good firms take their production and investment decisions. Ac-
cording to their expected demand, firms fix their desired production and, if nec-
essary, invest to expand their capital stock. A payback period rule is employed
to set replacement investment. Credit-rationed firms finance their investment,
first with their stock of liquid assets, and next, if necessary, with debt.
2. Capital-good market opens. Market shares and their changes depend on the
‘competitiveness’ of each machine-producing firm.
3. Consumption-good market opens. Consumption-good production takes place.
Unemployment rates and monetary wage emerge as the collective outcome of
micro-decisions. The size of the consumption-good demand depends on the
number of workers employed by firms. Consumption-good firms facing imper-
fectly informed consumers receive a fraction of the total demand as a function
of their price competitiveness.
4. Exit, technical change and entry. Firms facing negative net liquid assets and/or a
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non-positive market-share exit and they are replaced by new firms. Capital-good
firms stochastically search for new machines.
Finally, total consumption, investment, change in inventories, and total product
are obtained by aggregating individual time-t quantities.
4.2. PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT: THE CONSUMPTION-GOOD SECTOR
Each consumption-good firm j = 1, 2, . . . , F1 produces a homogenous good using
machines and labor under constant returns to scale. Planned output depends on
adaptive demand expectations of the form:
Dej (t) = f (D j (t − 1), Y (t − 1), D j (t − 2), Y (t − 2) . . .),
where D j (t − 1) is the demand of firm j at time t − 1 and Y (t − 1) is the level
of aggregate output at time t − 1. In fact, we explore different extrapolative rules
based on both firm-specific past demand and aggregate market signal (see section
4.3, below for details).
According to the expected demand and the inventories (N j ) inherited from the
previous period, firms fix their desired level of production (Qdj ):
Qdj (t) = Dej (t) − N j (t − 1). (1)
The stock of capital determines the maximum level of production achievable by
each firm. Hence, given the desired level of production, firms compute the desired
stock of capital as:
K dj (t) =
Qdj (t)
ud
, (2)
where ud is the desired level of capacity utilization.
Consumption-good firms decide whether to expand13 their stock of capital fol-
lowing an (S,s) model. They compute their trigger (K trigj ) level of capital as follows:
K trigj = K j (t)(1 + α), (3)
with 0 < α < 1. Firms then plan to increase their capital stock only if the desired
capital stock is higher than the trigger one:
E I j (t) =
{
0 if K dj (t) < K trigj (t)
K trigj (t) − K j (t) if K dj (t) ≥ K trigj (t),
(4)
where E I j (t) is the expansion investment.
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Such a routine-based behavior as already mentioned is amply justified by the
complexity of the environment in which the firms are nested, characterized by
strong market and technological uncertainty.
The stock of capital of each consumption-good firm is heterogeneous, since it
is composed of various vintages of machines which differ in terms of productivity.
Machines are measured in terms of their production capacity, which is normalized
to one. They are identified by a labor productivity coefficient Ai,τ , where i denotes
their producer and τ their generation (technical change takes place through the
creation of new generation of machines. See section 4.7 below for details). Let
 j (t) be the set of all types of machines belonging to firm j at time t. Firm j’s
capital stock is defined as:
K j (t) =
∑
Aiτ ∈ j (τ )
g j (Ai,τ , t),
where g j (Ai,τ , t) is the absolute frequency of machine Ai,τ . Given the nominal
wage w(t), the unit labor cost of each machine is computed as:
c(Ai,τ , t) = w(t)Ai,τ
Scrapping policies follow a payback-period routine. The replacement of an in-
cumbent machine depends on its degree of ‘technological’ obsolescence and on
the market price of new capital goods. More formally, firm j will scrap machines
Ai,τ ∈  j (t) if they satisfy:
RSj (t) =
{
Ai,τ ∈  j (t) : p
∗(t)
c(Ai,τ , t) − c∗(t) ≤ b
}
, (5)
where p∗ and c∗ are, respectively, the average market price and unit labor cost of
new machines, and b is a strictly positive payback-period parameter. Hence, the
replacement investment (RI j ) of firm j will be equal to:
RI j (t) =
∑
Ai,τ ∈RSj (t)
g j (Ai,τ , t), (6)
i.e. each consumption-good firm computes its replacement investment (RI j ) by
‘adding’ the number of machines that satisfy eq. (5). The level of investment (I j ) is
the sum of expansion and replacement investment. Summing up the actual invest-
ment of all consumption-good firms, we get aggregate investment (I ).
Firms must bear production costs before selling their output. Hence, they must
finance production as well as investment. In tune with the spirit of the evolutionary
perspective, but also of many New Keynesian models, we assume imperfect capital
market with credit rationing. Firms use first their stock of liquid assets (N W j )
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to finance production. If internal funds are not sufficient, firms borrow up to a
maximum debt/sales ratiomax, paying an interest rate r. More precisely, production
is rationed if:
c j (t)Q J (t) + Deb j (t − 1) > Sj (t − 1)max + N W j (t − 1),
where c j denotes unit cost of production, Sj is total sales and Deb j is the stock of
debt. If production is not rationed, firms finance investment relying on their residual
stock of liquid assets and, if necessary, on their residual debt availability. If firms
cannot afford to fully finance investment, they privilege expansion investment over
replacement investment.
When consumption-good firms receive new machines, they update their average
productivity (π j ) and their unit cost of production (c j ). Average productivity reads:
π j (t) =
∑
Ai,τ ∈ j (t)
Ai,τ
g j (Ai,τ , t)
K j (t)
,
while unit cost of production will be given by:
c j (t) = w(t)
π j (t)
Firms fix the price as a mark-up on their unit cost of production:
p j (t) = (1 + μ)c j (t),
with μ > 0. Given their average productivity and their production, consumption-
good firms determine their labor demand (L Dj ):
L Dj (t) =
Q j (t)
π j (t)
.
Firms compute their profits ( j ) as:
 j (t) = p j (t)Sj (t) − c j (t)Q j (t) − r Deb j (t).
The variation of the stock of liquid asset of consumption-good firms depends on
their profits as well as on their investment choices:
N W j (t) = N W j (t − 1) +  j (t) − cI j ,
where cI j is the amount of internal funds employed by firm j to finance investment.
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4.3. DEMAND EXPECTATIONS
As mentioned, we experiment with diverse forms of adaptive expectations charac-
terized by somewhat different computing abilities and extrapolating routines. In the
simplest case, we assume that consumption-good firms are endowed with perfectly
myopic expectations:
Dej (t) = D j (t − 1). (7)
Second, we allow for some extrapolative rule and a longer memory (call it the
autoregressive expectation case):
Dej (t) = β1 D j (t − 1) + β2 D j (t − 2) + β3 D j (t − 3) + β4 D j (t − 4), (8)
with 0 ≤ β1,2,3,4 < 1.
Third, we model firms considering both the level and the variation of their past
demand (	D j (t − 1)). In this case firms have accelerative expectations:
Dej (t) = [1 + β5	D j (t − 1)]D j (t − 1), (9)
with 0 < β5 < 1.
Fourth, we allow firms to learn also from their past forecast and past mistakes.
Let us call it the adaptive expectation case:
Dej (t) = Dej (t − 1) + β6[D j (t − 1) − Dej (t − 1)], (10)
with β6 > 0.
Finally, in the fifth case firms consider also the dynamics of the whole economy.
This is the micro-macro expectation case:
Dej (t) = [1 + β7	D j (t − 1) + β8	Y (t − 1)]D j (t − 1), (11)
where Y denotes the aggregate output and 0 < β7,8 < 1.
4.4. MACHINE PRODUCTION
In the previous sections we have modeled the formation of demand for capital
goods. Let us now describe how the machine producing sector works.
Each machine-tool firm i = 1, 2, . . . , F2 sells its latest generation of products
characterized by labor productivity coefficient Ai,τ , with τ = 1, 2, . . .. The pro-
duction process employs labor only under constant returns to scale. The unit cost
of production is specific to the firm and to the produced vintage:
ci (t) = w(t)Ai,τ .
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Firms set the price according to a mark-up (μ) rule:
pi (t) = (1 + μ)ci (t),
where μ ≥ 0.
As it happens in the consumption-good industry, machine-tool firms bear the
costs of production before receiving the revenues. They finance production with
their stock of liquid assets (N Wi ) and if necessary with external funds. Once the
level of production is determined, firms can hire workers according to:
L Di (t) =
Qi (t)
Ai,τ
,
where L Di is the labor demand of firm i.
Firm i’s profits (i ) will be then given by:
i (t) = [pi (t) − ci (t)]Qi (t) − r Debi (t).
The stock of liquid assets changes according to:
N Wi (t) = N Wi (t − 1) + i (t).
4.5. THE CONSUMPTION-GOOD MARKET
In this and in the next section we present how the markets for producer- and
consumer goods work. We first consider the consumption-good market.
Since consumption-good firms take their production decisions according to
their demand expectations, they can obviously make mistakes which are revealed
by variations in inventories. If in the previous period they produced too much
(Q j (t − 1) > D j (t − 1)), they accumulate stocks. On the contrary, if they were
not able to fully satisfy their past demand, their ‘competitiveness’ (E j ) at time t is
reduced:
E j (t) = −ω1 p j (t) − ω2l j (t) , (12)
where l j is the level of unfilled demand inherited from the previous period and
ω1,2 are non-negative parameters. The average sectorial competitiveness (E j ) is
obtained by weighting the competitiveness of each firm with its past market share
( f j (t − 1)):
E j (t) =
F1
∑
j=1
E j (t) f j (t − 1) .
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Under condition of imperfect information, consumers take time to imperfectly
adjust to relative consumption-good prices. Thus, market shares evolve accord-
ing to a replicator dynamics. More specifically, the market share of each firm
will grow (shrink) if its competitiveness is above (below) the industry-average
competitiveness:
f j (t) = f j (t − 1)
(
1 + χ1 E j (t) − E
j (t)
E j (t)
)
, (13)
with χ1 ≥ 0.14
Aggregate consumption (cf. section 4.8) shapes the demand-side of the market
and it is allocated to consumption-good firms according to their market share:
D j (t) = C(t) f j (t). (14)
4.6. THE CAPITAL-GOOD MARKET
Let us now turn to the capital-good market. Capital-good firms produce on demand.
Hence, since they are always able to fully satisfy their demand, their ‘competitive-
ness’ depends on the price they charge and on the productivity of the machines they
offer:
Ei (t) = −ω3 pi (t) + ω4 Ai,τ , (15)
where ω3 and ω4 are non-negative parameters. As in the consumption-good industry,
average sectoral competitiveness (Ei ) and market shares ( fi ) read:
Ei (t) =
F2
∑
i=1
Ei (t) fi (t − 1)
fi (t) = fi (t − 1)
(
1 + χ2 Ei (t) − E
i (t)
Ei (t)
)
, (16)
with χ2 ≥ 0. Also in this case, since the market is characterized by imperfect
information, there is inertia in the adjustment process of the market shares.
The demand side of the capital-good market depends on the investment choices
of consumption-good firms. More specifically, final-good firm orders determine
the size of the investment ‘cake’, whose slices (Di ) are allocated according to the
market share of each producers:
Di (t) = I (t) fi (t). (17)
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4.7. ENTRY, EXIT, AND TECHNICAL CHANGE
At the end of every period, firms with zero market shares and/or negative net assets
die and are replaced by new firms. Hence, the number of firms in both sectors
remain constant across time. In order not to bias the overall dynamics, we start
by assuming that each entrant is a random copy of a survived firm (see, however,
Section 5 for a discussion on more empirically-plausible entry rules).
As mentioned, our economy is fuelled by a never-ending process of technical
change. At the end of each period, machine-tool firms try to develop the next gen-
eration of their product (i.e. discovering machines with a higher labor productivity
coefficient). The result of their efforts is strongly uncertain: firms develop a proto-
type whose labor productivity (Ai,new) may be higher or lower than the one of the
currently manufactured machine. More formally, we let:
Ai,new = Ai,t (1 + ), (18)
where  ∼ U [ι1, ι2]. We also posit that firm i will release the next generation ma-
chine only if the latter entails a labor productivity improvement (i.e. Ai,new > Ai,τ ).
Finally, if the firm decides to produce the new machine, the index τ is accordingly
incremented by one unit.
4.8. MACRO DYNAMICS
The dynamics generated at the micro-level by individual decisions and interaction
mechanisms induces, at the macroeconomic level, a stochastic dynamics for all ag-
gregate variables of interest (e.g. output, investment, consumption, unemployment,
etc.).
Labor market is not cleared by real wage movements. As a consequence, in-
voluntary unemployment may arise. The aggregate supply of labor is exogenous,
inelastic and grows at a constant rate (η):
L(t) = L(t − 1)(1 + η).
The aggregate demand of labor is the sum of machine- and consumption-good
firms’ labor demands:
L D(t) =
F1
∑
j=1
L Dj +
F2
∑
i=1
L Di (t).
Hence, aggregate employment (Emp) reads:
Emp(t) = min(L D(t), L(t)). (19)
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The wage rate is determined by both institutional and market factors, with both
indexation mechanisms upon consumption prices and average productivity, on the
one hand, and, adjustments to unemployment rates, on the others:
w(t) = w(t − 1) +
(
1 + ψ1 cpi(t) − cpi(t − 1)
cpi(t − 1)
+ ψ2 A(t) − A(t − 1)A(t − 1) + ψ3
U (t) − U (t − 1)
U (t − 1)
)
, (20)
where cpi is the consumer price index, A is average labor productivity and U is the
unemployment rate. The system parameters ψ1,2,3 allow one to characterize various
institutional regimes for the labor market.
In addition to the industries producing consumption goods and machines – call
them the tradable sector of the economy – it is reasonable to assume a parallel
source of aggregate demand associated with a non-market sector – including of
course in its empirical counterpart government services. In the model, its admittedly
black-boxed representation is through a contribution to aggregate consumption
proportional to the whole labor force and the aggregate wage bill:
C(t) = w(t)Emp(t) + ϕw(t)L , (21)
with 0 < ϕ < 1.
Our model straightforwardly belongs to the evolutionary/ACE class. Since in
general, analytical, closed-form, solutions can hardly be obtained, one must resort
to computer simulations to analyze the properties of the (stochastic) processes
governing the coevolution of micro and macro variables.15
To do so, one should in principle address an extensive Monte Carlo analysis
in order to understand how the statistics of interests change together with initial
conditions and system parameters. Notice, in any case, that in our model the only
stochastic component affecting the underlying dynamics is given by technological
improvements in machine efficiencies. In fact, sensitivity exercises show that the
across-simulation stochastic variability is quite low and no chaotic pattern is de-
tected. Hence, we can confidently present below results concerning averages over
a limited number of replications (typically M = 50) as a robust proxy for the
behavior of all time-series of interest.
5. Simulation Results
How does the model fare in terms of its ability to account for the empirical regulari-
ties presented in sections 2.1 and 2.2? Here we shall present in detail the simulation
results under the ‘perfectly myopic’ scenario and compare them with the results
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Figure 1. Pooled (Year-Standardized) Sales Distributions. Log Rank vs. Log Size Plots. M-G:
Model-Generated Distribution. Perfectly Myopic Expectation Regime.
obtained in the other expectations regimes (see Section 4.3). The values of param-
eters and initial conditions are spelled out in Appendix A.
First, let us look at the outcomes of the model when technical change is turned off.
In this case, the model behaves like the Solow (1956) growth model: the economy
is in steady state and the output growth rate coincides with the labor supply growth
rate. Of course, if we keep the population constant, the output growth rate falls to
zero.
Second, as soon as one turns on technical change, self-sustaining patterns of
growth do emerge (see Fig. 3) and the average output growth rate (cf. eq. 22)
becomes significantly higher than the population growth rate. The analysis of in-
vestment components also shows that the behavior of aggregate investment is the
result of huge changes in both expansion and replacement investment (see Fig. 4).
Third, if we separate the business cycle frequencies of the series by applying
a bandpass filter,16 we observe the typical ‘roller coaster’ shape that characterizes
real data (see Fig. 5 and section 2.1 above).
Fourth, our simulated series of aggregate investment appear to be more volatile
than output, and expansion investment fluctuates more wildly than replacement
investment (cf. Fig. 6).
Fifth, aggregate investment and consumption seem to display a procyclical be-
havior. Interestingly, the foregoing qualitative properties do not significantly change
if we let consumption-good firms follow more sophisticated expectation formation
rules (cf. Section 4.3). As we show in much more detail in Dosi, Fagiolo, and
Roventini (2005), output and investment appear to be somewhat less volatile if
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Figure 2. Pooled (Year-Standardized) Firm Growth Rates. Binned Densities of Simulated
Growth Rates vs. Laplace Fit. M-G: Model-Generated Growth Rates. Perfectly Myopic Ex-
pectation Regime.
firms are now endowed with autoregressive expectations (cf. eq. 8). Moreover, if
one assumes autoregressive or accelerative expectation set-ups (cf. eq. 9), expan-
sion investment appears to be less lumpy (a more detailed comparison of alternative
expectation regimes is performed below).
Figure 3. Level of Output, Investment and Consumption. Perfectly Myopic Expectation
Regime.
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Figure 4. Expansion and Replacement Investment. Perfectly Myopic Expectation Regime.
An important advantage of the model as compared with its ‘representative agent’
rivals is that it also generates a microeconomic landscape consistent with the micro
‘stylized facts’ mentioned in section 2.2. So, for example, the skewed firm size
distributions which emerge in the simulations clearly depart from the log-normal
benchmark as happens in reality (cf. the rank-size plot in Figure 1).17 Moreover, in
tune with the empirical evidence, pooled growth rates of our simulated firms exhibit
Figure 5. Bandpass-Filtered Output, Investment and Consumption. Perfectly Myopic Expec-
tation Regime.
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Figure 6. Bandpass-Filtered Expansion and Replacement Investment. Perfectly Myopic Ex-
pectation Regime.
the typical ‘tent-shaped’ patterns, characterized by tails fatter than the Gaussian
benchmark (cf. Fig. 2). What is more, if one fits simulated distributions with the
family of Subbotin densities, the estimated shape-parameter turns out to be very
close to the one obtained in empirical studies.18
Let us now turn to a more detailed study of our simulated time-series. More
specifically, let us address the issue whether simulated series of aggregate output
growth, investment, consumption, etc. display statistical properties similar to the
empirically observed ones (as summarized in SF1 − 4).
We begin by focusing on the average growth rate (AGR) of the economy:
AG RT = log Y (T ) − log Y (0)T + 1 , (22)
where Y denotes aggregate output and compute Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests on output,
consumption and investment in order to detect the presence of unit roots in the series.
All results refer to averages computed across M = 50 independent simulations.
The average growth rate of output, consumption and investment are strictly
positive (≈1.5%, see top panel of Table II) and DF tests suggest that output, con-
sumption, and investment are non-stationary.
We then detrend the time series obtained from simulations with a bandpass
filter (6,32,12) and we compute standard deviations and cross-correlations between
output and the other series.19 Relative standard deviation levels suggest that the
model is able to match SF1 (i.e. investment is considerably more volatile than
output) and SF2 (i.e. consumption is less volatile than output). The volatility of
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Table II. Output, Investment and Consumption Statistics under Alternative Demand
Expectations Regimes.
GDP Consumption Investment
Perfectly Myopic Expectations
Avg. growth rate (%) 1.50% 1.51% 1.54%
Dickey-Fuller test (logs) 2.8715 3.9986 −0.9186
Dickey-Fuller test (bpf 6,32,12) −4.8703∗ −4.8040∗ −5.6382∗
Std. Dev. (bpf 6,32,12) 0.1931 0.1659 0.6089
Rel. Std. Dev. (GDP) 1 0.8590 3.1536
Autoregressive Expectations
Avg. growth rate (%) 1.54% 1.53% 1.58%
Dickey-Fuller test (logs) 6.4372 9.4470 −0.4309
Dickey-Fuller test (bpf 6,32,12) −4.8703∗ −4.8380∗ −5.1365∗
Std. Dev. (bpf 6,32,12) 0.0767 0.0672 0.3183
Rel. Std. Dev. (GDP) 1 0.8763 4.1482
Accelerative Expectations
Avg. growth rate (%) 1.52% 1.50% 1.66%
Dickey-Fuller test (logs) 2.2160 3.6865 −0.3357
Dickey-Fuller test (bpf 6,32,12) −5.5105∗ −5.5063∗ −5.9885∗
Std. Dev. (bpf 6,32,12) 0.1630 0.1379 0.4059
Rel. Std. Dev. (GDP) 1 0.8463 2.4909
Adaptive Expectations
Avg. growth rate (%) 1.56% 1.56% 1.73%
Dickey-Fuller test (logs) 3.0319 4.1459 −0.8462
Dickey-Fuller test (bpf 6,32,12) −4.9501∗ −4.8922∗ −5.6906∗
Std. Dev. (bpf 6,32,12) 0.1915 0.1646 0.6085
Rel. Std. Dev. (GDP) 1 0.8596 3.1775
Micro-Macro Expectations
Avg. growth rate (%) 1.44% 1.45% 0.53%
Dickey-Fuller test (logs) 2.4223 3.1405 −1.7463
Dickey-Fuller test (bpf 6,32,12) −5.6499∗ −5.5816∗ −5.8515∗
Std. Dev. (bpf 6,32,12) 0.2118 0.1792 0.7649
Rel. Std. Dev. (GDP) 1 0.8463 3.6123
Asterisks (∗): Significative at 99% level.
aggregate investment is indeed 3 times larger than the output one, whereas the
relative volatility of consumption is 0.86.
As far as cross-correlations are concerned, consumption, investment and change
in inventories all appear to satisfy SF3: they are procyclical and coincident vari-
ables (cf. top panel of Table III). Moreover, as Fig. 7 shows, our simulated cross-
correlation patterns are qualitatively similar to those obtained by Stock and Watson
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Figure 7. Model Generated (M-G) vs. Empirical Data (S-W: Stock and Watson, 1999) Cross-
correlations. Perfectly Myopic Expectation Regime.
(1999) on U.S. data. Notice that business cycle models (e.g. RBC models) usu-
ally attempt to match only contemporaneous correlations between GDP and other
variables. On the contrary, our model is able to qualitatively replicate the entire
cross-correlation structures (i.e. at different leads and lags).
In addition, employment turns out to be procyclical, while the unemployment
rate is anticyclical (SF4), Yet, the two variables appear to be coincident. This result
may stem from the complete lack of frictions that characterizes the labor market in
our model. Indeed, since in every time period firms can hire and fire workers without
limitations, production fluctuations pour out in the labor market with no lags.
If we move to the other expectation regimes, the ability of the model to repli-
cate SF1 − 4 does not significantly change. Investment relative standard devia-
tion increases in the autoregressive expectation scenario (cf. 2nd panel of Table II
from the top), whereas it becomes lower in the accelerative expectation regime (cf.
Table II, 3rd panel), but, in any case, SF1 is always matched. According to cross-
correlations, SF3 is not completely satisfied only in the autoregressive expectation
scenario. Investment becomes slightly leading and change in inventories turns to
slightly lagging (see 2nd panel of Table III).
The model is also robust to different entry rules. Indeed, in line with the firm
demography literature, we have modified the entry rule in order to have entrants
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Table IV. Robustness of Simulation Results to Alternative Entry Rules. N Win : Stock of
Liquid Assets of Entrant Firms (Perfectly Myopic Expectation Regime).
GDP (bpf 6,32,12)
Entry Rule
N Win ≥ ζ N Wk Series
Avg.
Gr. Rate
Std. Dev.
(bpf 6,32,12) t − 1 t t + 1
GDP 1.59% 0.1719 0.8946 1 0.8946
ζ = 1 Consumption 1.57% 0.1460 0.9053 0.9969 0.8825
Investment 1.75% 0.5764 0.6216 0.7381 0.7207
GDP 1.53% 0.1730 0.8949 1 0.8949
ζ = 0.75 Consumption 1.51% 0.1468 0.9054 0.9970 0.8831
Investment 1.36% 0.5992 0.6300 0.7322 0.7058
GDP 1.51% 0.1784 0.8896 1 0.8896
ζ = 0.5 Consumption 1.50% 0.1517 0.8995 0.9979 0.8802
Investment 1.50% 0.5303 0.6641 0.7673 0.7152
that are on average smaller than incumbents. More precisely, for each industry, we
compute the average stock of liquid assets of survived firms (N W k , with k = j, i)
and we build entrants as random copies of those survived firms that hold a stock of
liquid assets smaller than ζ N W k , with 0 < ζ ≤ 1. As Table IV shows, simulation
results do not substantially change if we progressively reduce the relative size of
entrants with respect to incumbents (compare, for instance, Table IV with the top
panel of Tables II and III).20
We have also checked whether our model is able to match the microeconomic
stylized facts on productivity dynamics (SF10−11). To do so, we compute – at each
t – the standard deviation of labor productivities across consumption-good firms.
Our results (see Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini, 2005) indicate that significantly
asymmetries persist throughout the history of our simulated economy (in tune
with SF10). Moreover, firm-specific productivity auto-correlations turn out to be
significantly larger than zero, thus suggesting persistency in micro productivity
differentials (cf. SF11).21
6. Conclusions
In this work, we have begun to explore the properties of an evolutionary, agent-based
model wherein macroeconomics dynamics is nested into heterogenous boundedly
rational firms which operate in two vertically linked sectors, producing ‘machines’
and a consumption good. Technical progress is machine-specific and diffuses in
the economy via time-consuming investment by users. In turn, investment and
production decisions induce demand propagation effects much alike Keynesian
‘multiplier’ effects. Conversely, adaptive expectations on demand drive investments
in manners closely resembling the Keynesian ‘accelerator’.
The results, despite the simplicity of the model, appear to be surprisingly in tune
with a rather long list of empirical ‘stylized facts’ – concerning both the properties
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of aggregate variables and the underlying microeconomics. The overall picture
stemming from the simulation results is one where self-sustaining, fluctuating pat-
terns of growth emerge out of the interactions among firms operating in market
regimes that strongly depart from perfect competition. Firms undergo a permanent
process of selection and try to cope – albeit imperfectly – with a turbulent envi-
ronment characterized by endogenous demand waves and technological shocks.
This in turn induces lumpiness in individual firm growth patterns, with relatively
frequent episodes of larger- or smaller-than-average growth.
Self-sustained growth comes together with fluctuations in macroeconomic vari-
ables characterized by statistical properties similar to the empirically observed one.
Interestingly, preliminary investigations appear to suggest that such properties are
relatively independent from the specification of expectation formation. Rather, it is
the heterogeneity among the agents which is crucial to generate dynamic properties
of the model.
Evolutionary microfoundations – in the form of multiple agents, who are im-
perfectly adaptive in their behavior but also able to innovate – are shown to support
macrodynamics with strong Keynesian features.
Appendix: Simulations and System Parameters
All simulation results presented above refer to the benchmark setup described in
Table A-I. Initial conditions are defined as in Table A-II.
Table A-I. Benchmark Parametrization.
Description Symbol Value
Size of Consumption-good Industry F1 200
Size of Capital-good Industry F2 50
Econometric Sample Size T 600
Replicator Dynamics Coeff. χ1,2 −0.5
Competitiveness weights ω1,2,3,4 1
Uniform Distribution Support: Lower Bound ι1 −0.5
Uniform Distribution Support: Upper Bound ι2 0.5
Labor Supply Growth Rate η 0.01
Wage Setting: 	cpi weight ψ1 0.75
Wage Setting: 	A weight ψ2 1
Wage Setting: 	U weight ψ3 0.1
Desired level of capacity utilization ud 0.75
Trigger rule α 0.1
Payback Period Parameter b 4
Mark-up rule μ 0.3
Interest rate r 0.01
Wage share ϕ 0.1
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Table A-II. Initial Conditions.
Description Symbol Value
Market Wage w(0) 100
Consumer Price Index cpi(0) 1.3
Average Labor Productivity A(0) 100
Liquid Assets N Wi j (0) 3000
Capital Stock K j (0) 2000
Labor Supply L(0) 3000
The simulation results we get under different expectation regimes are quiet robust
to different expectation parametrizations. The results reported in the paper have been
obtained with β1 = 0.7, β2 = 0.3, β3,4 = 0; β5 = 0.25; β6 = 1; β7 = 0.05 and
β8 = 0.25.
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Notes
1In recent refinements, the size of the shocks might be lower (King and Rebelo, 1999), but the
basic story remains rather unbelievable.
2More on evolutionary and ‘agent-based computational economics’ (ACE) approaches in eco-
nomics is in Dosi and Nelson (1994), Dosi and Winter (2002), Epstein and Axtell (1996) and Tesfatsion
(1997).
3See for instance Stock and Watson (1999).
4Notice that the following aggregate regularities are fairly robust to diverse, relatively sophisti-
cated statistical analyses. Cf. for example Stock and Watson (1999), Agresti and Mojon (2001) and
Napoletano, Roventini, and Sapio (2006), who employ a bandpass filter (based on Baxter and King,
1999) to US data ranging from 1956Q1 to 1996Q4, EMU series going from 1970Q1 to 2000Q3, and
Italian/U.S. data for the period 1970Q1 – 2002Q3, respectively. See also Kydland and Prescott (1990)
who apply a HP filter to US data from 1954Q1 to 1989Q4.
5Agresti and Mojon (2001) find that consumption is slightly leading in the EMU area. Napoletano,
Roventini, and Sapio (2006) obtain the same result with US data and also find that invest-
ment is slightly lagging in Italy. However, since these differences stem from very small changes
in the cross-correlation structure, they may just depend on the filter employed to detrend the
series.
6See Hubbard (1998) for a survey.
7See, among others, Fazzari and Athey (1987) and Bond and Meghir (1994). For an alternative
point of view, cf. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Erickson and Whited (2000).
8Note that some subsequent models do analyze the properties of economic fluctuations (Silver-
berg and Lehnert, 1994; Fagiolo and Dosi, 2003). However, the latter are just the outcome of some
underlying ‘Schumpeterian’ dynamics of innovation and imitation.
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9See Caballero (1999) for a discussion. Cf. also Blinder and Maccini (1991) for a survey of (S,s)
inventory behavior models.
10An exception is in Thomas (2002). She develops a real business cycle model where firms take their
investment decisions according to a (S,s) rule. However, in this model, lumpy investment does not have
any significant impact at the macro level, because households preferences for smooth consumption
paths sterilize investment lumpiness through price movements (i.e. real wage and interest rate).
11This in line with empirical evidence discussed in Feldstein and Foot (1971), Eisner (1972),
Goolsbee (1998), who show that replacement investment is typically not proportional to the capital
stock.
12All updating steps are carried out using a ‘parallel updating scheme’. More specifically, all firms
have simultaneously access to the updating step and base their decisions on the most recent observation
of the variables affecting their updating decision.
13We assume that there are no secondary markets for capital goods. Hence, firms have no incentives
to reduce their capital stock.
14In both consumption- and capital-good markets, a firm dies if its market share ceases to be positive
and market shares of the remaining firms are correspondingly re-adjusted (cf. Dosi et al., 1995).
15On the ‘methodology’ of evolutionary/ACE models, see Nelson and Winter (1982), Lane
(1993a,b), Kwasnicki (1998), Dosi and Winter (2002), Pyka and Fagiolo (2005).
16See Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini (2005) for a discussion of the properties of alternative filtering
techniques.
17We employ consumption-good firm sales (S) as a proxy of firm size and we normalize each
observation by the year-average of firm size in order to remove any time trends in our data. This
allows one to get stationary size and growth distributions across years and to safely pool normalized
size distributions. For a similar approach see, among others, Bottazzi, Cefis, and Dosi (2002).
18On the theory and empirics of Subbotin fits of firm growth rate distributions, see Bottazzi and
Secchi (2003a,b).
19All results refer to the choice of T = 600, cf. Appendix A. This econometric sample size is
sufficient to allow for convergence of recursive moments of all statistics of interest.
20Since the net entry rate is zero by definition, an increasing labor supply should force either the
unemployment rate or the average firm size to growth. We find instead that the unemployment rate is
always smaller than one and follows a stationary process, whereas the average firm size grows over
time. Note that the normalization of firm sizes in all our estimates prevent the latter property to bias
firm size distributions.
21More precisely, in the last 100 periods of the simulations, we consider the normalized productivity
of firms that survived for at least 40 periods and we compute auto-correlations until lag 6.
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